Salesforce at 2.8x ARR, HubSpot Down 56%, Adobe at 11x Earnings: Are They Just Too Oversold Now?

Four months ago the markets decided B2B software was dead.

In a 48-hour stretch in February, roughly $285 billion in software market cap evaporated. The trigger was the fear that AI agents would make per-seat licensing obsolete, that the entire model of charging companies for seats their employees would no longer need was about to collapse. The market gave it a name: the SaaSpocalypse. The IGV software index fell more than a third from its September highs, hit a 52-week low on April 10, and at the bottom around 75% of software stocks were screening as technically oversold.

But since then, the broad software index has ripped back more than 40% off the April low.

But not everyone has ripped back. Three of our most iconic B2B leaders (Salesforce, HubSpot, Adobe) kept sliding to fresh 52-week lows. The recovery left them behind. One of them is arguably the cheapest large-cap software stock in a decade. One is the fastest grower of the three and quietly cheap on revenue. And one is carrying the most direct exposure to the exact fear that started the panic.

Are these Big 3 … oversold? Is 3x ARR a bargain for B2B leaders with real AI revenue?

The fear that drove the selloff

Salesforce, HubSpot, and Adobe built franchises by charging per seat. More employees, more licenses, more revenue. If AI agents do the work of those employees, the logic goes, headcount stops growing, seats stop growing, and the revenue model caps out or shrinks.

It is a clean thesis. It is also testable. The way you test it is by watching whether these companies can convert AI from a threat into a line item that grows faster than the core. So far, the results are mixed. “AI revenue” is up and real, but it hasn’t fueled material net growth for these Big 3. Yet.

Salesforce: the cheapest it has looked … ever

Salesforce entered earnings as the worst-performing stock in the Dow this year, down about 32% before the quarter printed. The market had effectively concluded that Agentforce was a science project and that the core CRM seat business was the most exposed in enterprise software.

**The Q1 FY2027 numbers told a different story. Revenue of $11.13 billion grew 13% (12% in constant currency). **

Non-GAAP EPS jumped 50% to $3.88. And the non-GAAP operating margin hit 34.8%, a record and a 250-basis-point expansion in a single year. For a company that spent a decade absorbing criticism over dilution and bloated spend, that margin number reframes the entire profitability debate.

The headline that mattered most was Agentforce. ARR crossed $1.2 billion, up roughly 205% year over year. Combined with Data 360, the agentic and data layer is now around $3.4 billion in ARR, growing north of 200%. That makes Agentforce the fastest-scaling AI product line any enterprise software company has disclosed this year.

Two details inside that number do real work. First, more than half of Agentforce and Data 360 bookings came from existing customers expanding their deployments. That is the textbook signal of product-market fit, not pilot churn. Second, Agentforce is not priced per seat. It is priced per Agentic Work Unit, a consumption charge tied to workflow output. If that holds at scale, Salesforce revenue per customer is no longer capped by headcount. It is capped by workflow volume, which can grow even as headcount shrinks. That is the same architectural shift that turned consumption-based data and infrastructure businesses into the most valuable franchises of the last decade.

The bear case did not disappear. Full-year guidance of roughly $45.9 to $46.2 billion implies about 11% growth, and once you strip out the Informatica acquisition, organic growth is closer to 6 to 7%.

Commerce Cloud and Tableau were both flagged as soft. The core is maturing, and every dollar of net-new Agentforce ARR carries some risk of substituting for a Sales Cloud or Service Cloud seat rather than adding to it.

But look at the price. Salesforce gave the entire post-earnings pop back and then kept falling.

The stock now sits around $152, down roughly 43% on the year and parked right on its 52-week low, which works out to about 11x forward non-GAAP earnings against a software industry near 27x. What dragged it back to the lows was not the quarter. It was a fresh round of layoffs in early June that touched Agentforce, MuleSoft, and Marketing Cloud, the acquisition of usage-based billing platform m3ter, and a broad AI-driven software selloff. A Rule-of-40 company (about 47.8 here) trading at roughly 11x forward, retiring 10% of its shares through a $25 billion accelerated buyback, carrying a PEG near 0.47 and a 12% free cash flow yield, with the largest AI revenue line in the category, is not the setup the “structurally impaired” thesis describes. The market is pricing the cannibalization risk as if it has already happened. The income statement says the opposite. At least one sell-side shop agrees: Monness upgraded the stock to Buy this week, calling the valuation compelling with shares 58% off their all-time high.

Why It’s Oversold:

• Agentforce ARR at $1.2 billion growing 205% is the largest and fastest AI revenue line in enterprise software, and it is priced per workflow rather than per seat, so it is not capped by customer headcount.
• A record 34.8% operating margin plus a $25 billion buyback retiring 10% of shares pushes earnings per share higher even at 11% revenue growth.
• At roughly 11x forward earnings, a 0.47 PEG, and a 12% free cash flow yield while sitting at 52-week lows, it is priced for a decline the income statement is not showing.

Why It Isn’t:

• Strip out the Informatica acquisition and full-year organic growth is closer to 6 to 7%, so the core is maturing.
• Commerce Cloud and Tableau are soft, and per-seat Sales and Service Cloud licenses are the most exposed in software to agent substitution.
• The June layoffs across Agentforce and MuleSoft teams cut against the “AI is pure upside” story and signal cost management, not just demand.

HubSpot: fastest grower, hit the hardest

HubSpot is the most violent chart of the three. The stock is down about 56% this year, trading around $171 just off a fresh 52-week low, against a 52-week high above $600. On price alone it looks like the market gave up on it entirely.

It’s hard to believe at $3.5B+ ARR HubSpot is now trading at … less than $9 Billion. 2.5x ARR.

The operating numbers do not match that abandonment:

• Q1 revenue grew 23% as reported (18% in constant currency) to $881 million. ARR reached $3.45 billion.
• Perhaps most importanly, the customer base crossed nearly 300,000, up 16%, with 10,800 net new adds in a single quarter. Net new customers are your future.
• Non-GAAP operating margin expanded 4 points to 17.8%, with the company raising full-year margin guidance to 21%, hitting its 2027 target a full year early.

The AI monetization signal is early (HubSpot should probably be further along here) but pointed in the right direction. Active core seat users grew 90% year over year. Credits consumed grew 67% quarter over quarter. The Spring Spotlight launch shipped Customer Agent, Prospecting Agent, and Data Agent, and HubSpot is layering in outcome-based pricing for AI credits on top of core seats. Management’s framing is that AI adds two monetization levers, seats and credits, rather than replacing the seat model outright. Larger deals ($60K+ ARR) grew up to 64%, which means the upmarket motion is real, not aspirational.

HubSpot (and also Monday) are the most exposed to the original fear because it sells primarily to SMB and mid-market go-to-market teams. The per-seat-to-agent transition hits hardest where the seat is a salesperson or a service rep an agent can plausibly stand in for. That is the legitimate risk. The counter is that clean, unified customer data is the prerequisite for any agent to work, and HubSpot’s whole pitch is being that data and AI foundation for companies that do not want to stit