Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation

A new study introduces an 'exit-and-join' dynamical model that enables intelligent agents to form optimal coalitions in a decentralized manner, bridging cooperative and noncooperative game theory.
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
Title:Exit-and-Join Dynamics for Decentralized Coalition Formation
View PDF HTML (experimental)Abstract:This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions. Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition rather than through a globally negotiated coalition structure. The resulting model links cooperative payoff allocation with noncooperative best-response behavior: a terminal partition is precisely a coalition structure with no admissible, individually profitable exit-and-join deviation. We establish equilibrium characterizations, identify conditions under which the dynamics admit scalar Lyapunov or exact-potential representations, and analyze how switching and acceptance costs shape local stability. Numerical experiments test finite-time stabilization, cost sensitivity, and a special convex-game benchmark.
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Source: arXiv cs.AI Recent












